OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA JUN 18 2012

FILED

## BEFORE THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF MEMBERS OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,	) PDJ-2011-9002 )
Rachel R. Alexander, Bar No. 020092	ORDER DENYING EXTENSION AND DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
	) (Honorable William J. O'Neil)

FILED: 6/18/2012

Respondent

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At, or shortly after 5:00 P.M June 6, 2012 Respondent Rachel R. Alexander filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file her opening brief. The Motion is denied. The appeal of Ms. Alexander not being perfected it is deemed abandoned and ordered dismissed. Now Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED, dismissing the Appeal of Respondent, Rachel R. Alexander.

Ms. Alexander cites rules 3 and 5(b) of the Arizona Rules of Appellate Procedure as authority for her motion. Those rules do not apply in disciplinary matters. Only Rules 6(c) and 13 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure apply in disciplinary matters. See Rule 48 Ariz.R.Sup.Ct. The appellate process in disciplinary matters is set forth in Rule 59, Ariz.R.Sup.Ct.

Perfection of the appeal is a precondition to the disciplinary clerk transmitting the appeal record to the Supreme Court. Rule 59(h) states, "For purposes of this rule, perfection shall include the timely filing of a notice of appeal...and the timely filing of the appellant's or cross-appellant's opening brief." While an extension of the notice of appeal may be sought under Rule 59(b), no such authorization is provided for the extension of the time to file an opening brief. Regardless, some equitable or legal basis would be required in any event. If Rule 3 or Rule 5(b) of the Arizona Rules of Appellate

Procedure were applicable, good cause would be required. No good cause is demonstrated.

The reasons stated by Ms. Alexander consist of the following.

- 1) She is attempting to obtain legal counsel.
- 2) She has become ill.

There is an enormous difference between good faith and a reasonable basis or good cause. The PDJ does not doubt that Ms. Alexander requests an extension of time in good faith. Good faith has been defined by our courts as "honesty of purpose and absence of intent to defraud." *Geomet Explorations, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp.*, 124 Ariz. 55, 59, 601 P.2d 1339, 1343 (1979). A reason to exercise discretion requires more than an honesty of purpose or the absence of intent to defraud.

Ms. Alexander knew long ago that her prior counsel would not be representing her on any appeal in this matter. It was Ms. Alexander, not her prior attorney, who filed on April 20, 2012 her Notice of Appeal. It was Ms. Alexander, not her prior counsel who negotiated and filed an unopposed Motion to stay her suspension, agreeing to work under a practice monitor. Under that agreement reached with Independent Bar Counsel Ms. Alexander presumably continued to practice law. Ms. Alexander knew well in advance the date her opening brief was due. This is not a case where Ms. Alexander did not receive notice of the due date from the clerk. Ms. Alexander was notified by that clerk on May 7, 2012 that her opening brief was required to be filed by June 6, 2012.

Additionally Ms. Alexander offers no support for her statements. Left unexplained is why Ms. Alexander would wait until June 1, 2012 to file her six page Declaratory Action in Superior Court attempting to obtain the counsel she apparently believes she has needed since the middle of April, 2012. Left unexplained is why Ms. Alexander would delay filing the six lines of her motion to extend time until at or past the time her brief was due. These are troubling concerns that point towards delay, intentional or not, rather than diligence. There are no unique or compelling circumstances given to explain the delay in filing the request, nor is there reasonable cause given to extend the time. While the PDJ is sympathetic for the physical plight Ms. Alexander states, such statement

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is not sufficient. To the contrary, Ms. Alexander's delay in filing these pleadings hearken in the same way to her conduct which the hearing panel found inexplicable.

There is neither need nor intent to dig up every ethical mistake of Ms. Alexander which the record demonstrated and was found by the hearing panel. However, Ms. Alexander is not aided by ignoring either the character weaknesses or faulty track record which the hearing in this matter revealed. The purpose of the attorney discipline system is the "(1) maintenance of the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public, (2) protection of the public from unethical or incompetent lawyers, and (3) deterrence of other lawyers from engaging in illegal or unprofessional conduct." *In re Murray*, 159 Ariz. 280, 282, 767 P.2d 1, 3 (1988).

However it is also, to the extent possible, the intent of attorney discipline to aid in the rehabilitation of an errant lawyer. *In re Hoover*, 155 Ariz. 192, 197, 745 P.2d 939, 944 (1987). At some point in time it is presumed Ms. Alexander will seek reinstatement. At such time the burden will be upon Ms. Alexander to, among other things, establish by clear and convincing evidence that she has identified the weaknesses that caused the misconduct and demonstrate that she has overcome those weaknesses. *In re Arrotta*, 208 Ariz. 509, 513, 917, 96 P.3d 213, 217 (2004).

Ultimately, dodging the responsibility of one's disobedience serves no long term purpose. Ms. Alexander drew airtight conclusions that were full of legal, factual and ethical holes. For reinstatement, simplistic explanations must be replaced with realistic reflection if the deeper things of ethics are to begin to emerge and eclipse shallow rationalizations. It is hoped that these first hand observations of Ms. Alexander will aid in that process.

- 1. <u>Ms. Alexander knew the action or inaction of other lawyers would not change her obligations under the ethical rules.</u>
  - Q. All right. I want to ask you a couple of questions about your duties as a lawyer. Can we agree that every lawyer admitted in Arizona has a unique and personal responsibility to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct?
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. And can we agree that the conduct of any other lawyer who may or may not be directly associated with you, his or her conduct doesn't change the nature of your obligation under the rules, does it?

## A. That's correct.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 5:16-6:1, Oct. 19, 2011

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2. Ms. Alexander met Andrew Thomas during his campaign, he personally hired her to work directly for him as his special assistant, which she did in the Executive Suite.

Q All right. Let me ask a little bit about your relationship with Andrew Thomas. How did you first meet Mr. Thomas?

A I believe I met him at a County Attorney primary debate where I was on the panel, asking questions.

Q And that was when he was running for County Attorney the first time? **A Correct.** 

Q So that would have been in 2004?

A Yes.

Q So shortly after he became County Attorney, he hired you?

A Correct.

Q And in what position were you hired?

A He hired me on as a Deputy County Attorney/Special Assistant.

 ${\bf Q}\ {\bf I}$  know. Tell me what that means, slash? I know what the Deputy County Attorney means. What about the Special Assistant?

A I would be helping out with a lot of things like policy projects for him.

Q All right. So in that capacity, you were working directly for Mr. Thomas? A Yes.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 7:16-8:11 and 8:16-18, Oct. 19, 2011

3. Ms. Alexander was not directed to take over the RICO suit. Mr. Thomas asked if she was willing to take it over in early December, 2009. Ms. Alexander failed to tell him she had no trial experience.

Q All right. Now, tell me about the conversations you had with Mr. Thomas prior to this e-mail of December 11th, 2009 regarding the racketeering case.

A He asked me -- I don't know, a couple days - a few days in advance if I would be willing to take it over since he was concerned that there was -- there might be a conflict with Lisa Aubuchon handling the case.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 24:14-20, Oct. 19, 2011

A. Yes.

Q. And what was the discussion?

A. I talked to her about the matter, I told her that I realized that I had to transfer the RICO case to another civil attorney from Lisa because of the parallel proceedings issue. I wondered if she would be willing to assume responsibility for it, I told her I thought it was important, I told her some of the facts related to it, she was familiar with some of them.

Q. Did she respond?

Q. And did you discuss with Ms. Alexander her qualifications to handle such a matter?

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A. She responded positively, she wanted to know more about the case, she responded positively initially.

Q. And did she express any reluctance about handling a matter such as a federal civil racketeering action against members of the Board of Supervisors, judges, and attorneys?

A. I don't remember reluctance regarding the identity of the defendants. I do remember she had some just concerns about the heft of the case and she thought she was up to it, ultimately.

Q. When you assigned the matter to her, were you aware that Ms. Alexander had absolutely no trial experience?

A. No.

Q. You did not know that?

A. No.

Thomas Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 151:21-23, Oct. 26, 2011

- 4. Mr. Thomas made Ms. Alexander no promises about obtaining help from outside firms and Ms. Alexander knew Peter Spaw had no Federal RICO experience.
  - Q. Did you make any promises to Ms. Alexander about her obtaining help from outside firms?

A. No, not that I recall.

Thomas Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 153:23-25, Oct. 26, 2011

Q. You now know, based on his testimony, that, in fact, he (Peter Spaw) had no racketeering experience?

A. My understanding is he has expertise in State criminal RICO law, which is different from the Federal civil RICO law. So it doesn't correlate exactly over, but it was, you know, the closest probably we had in the office to an expert in that area.

Q. Okay. But if you listened to his testimony, you'd know that he worked in the forfeiture area. The forfeiture law just happened to, I guess, connect to the RICO statute in some way, but he had never handled a Federal racketeering case. You're now aware of that; correct?

A. I have been aware of that.

Q. Since his testimony?

- A. No, I understood that -- that he was State criminal RICO law. I knew that all along.
- Q. All right. So if you -- so did you ask Mr. Thomas at the time that he told you that Mr. Spaw was a RICO expert, "Wait a minute. I'm not sure Mr. Spaw is a RICO expert." Did you ask him that?

A. No.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 31:2-25, Oct. 19, 2011

5. Ms. Alexander knew she was in charge of the case, independent of others.

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Q. With your name appearing on the signature line on the pleading, your understanding would be that the court would see you as the person in charge of that case; is that true?

## A. I do understand that, yes.

- Q. And so at that point with your name on that case, would you consider yourself to be the responsible party for that pleading?
- A. I do understand, yes, I'm responsible for that.
- Q. Did you understand that at the time?
- A. Yes, I did.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 67:13-24, Nov. 2, 2011

- 6. <u>In early January, Ms. Alexander still did not have the investigative file and went to</u>
  Mr. Thomas to find it.
  - **Q.** Do you recall at the end of December, early January, a teleconference with you, Pete Spaw, Jeff Duvendack, and lawyers from Ogletree Deakins? **A. Yes.**
  - Q. And do you remember -- tell us about the conversation; do you remember someone suggested that the factual basis, the investigatory file needed to be located?
  - A. Yes, I do recall that.
  - Q. How did you react?
  - A. I was instructed by Pete Spaw to go find it and I said I would make an effort to go find it.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 42:22-43:8, Nov. 2, 2011

- Q. Now, there came a time when you made efforts to try to find all the file, the factual support for the RICO matter; correct?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Would you tell us what you did?
- A. I asked Andrew Thomas how I would go about getting that. I didn't want to ask Lisa Aubuchon because at that point we, you know, cut ourselves off from that other side, and so Andrew Thomas instructed me to go talk to Sally Wells because she had, you know, all these files.

  Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 46:22-47:7, Nov. 2, 2011
- 7. Ms. Alexander never personally saw any evidence supporting the allegations in the RICO suit.
  - Q. In the complaint there are several items listed right up front, bribery, extortion, hindering, obstruction of prosecution; this is in the amended complaint that you signed. Did you find did you personally see evidence of bribery?
  - A: I would say I didn't personally see it, but I was relying upon the, you know, firsthand testimony from experienced prosecutors in our office.
  - Q. Right, but I'm asking you as the person who signed the complaint, did you actually physically ever see firsthand evidence of bribery?
  - A. Not me myself.

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Q. Did you personally ever see firsthand evidence of extortion?

A: Not me.

Q. How about hindering?

A. Not me.

- Q. And obstruction of prosecution, did you see any evidence personally of that?
- A. Again, I'm just going off the newspaper reports --
- Q. No, no, just you personally.
- A. Not me personally.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 68:18-69:14, Nov. 2, 2011

- 8. <u>Despite Peter Spaw</u>, <u>Jeff Duvendack and the lawyers from Ogletree</u>, <u>Deaikins discussing dismissing the RICO suit</u>, <u>Ms. Alexander would not dismiss the RICO suit unless Mr. Thomas approved</u>. <u>Ms. Alexander was not ordered to do anything</u>.
  - Q. And did someone during that call discuss the possibility of maybe dismissing the complaint and starting over?
  - A. I believe both Pete Spaw and Eric Dowell suggested dismissing the complaint.

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- Q. What did you say?
- A. I said I believe we should discuss this with Andrew Thomas and, you know, see if he's amenable to it and if he agrees, then, you know, I have no problem with that.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 43:10-13 & 43:16-20, Nov. 2, 2011

- 9. <u>Neither Mr. Spaw nor Mr. Thomas directly or indirectly threatened Ms. Alexander.</u>

  <u>No one prevented Ms. Alexander from withdrawing from the representation.</u>
  - Q. Given the direction and supervision and input you were getting from Mr. Spaw, it didn't dawn on you to go to Mr. Thomas and say let me off the case, did it? **A. No.**
  - Q. At any time during your involvement with the racketeering case, did Mr. Spaw threaten you?

A. No.

Q. At any time during your involvement in the racketeering case, did Mr. Thomas threaten you?

A. No.

- Q. At any time during your involvement with the racketeering case, was there a situation in which you couldn't have just said I'm done and stopped working on the case?
- A. In the sense that I could just on my own tell Mr. Spaw and Mr. Thomas I'm done, I could have; it wasn't a very good idea. I mean --
- Q. You're a lawyer, Ms. Alexander. Could you have said no, I'm not going to work on this case?

A. Yes.

Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 59:10-60:13, Nov. 2, 2011

1	10. Ms. Alexander knew the conduct of others, including her supervisors, had no
2	impact on her duties under the Rules of Professional Conduct
3	Q. Now, you've testified with regard to what you believe Mr. Thomas's conduct
4	was, what you believe Ms. Wells' conduct was, and what you believe Mr. Spaw's conduct was in this case. Can we agree that their conduct has no impact on your
5	duties under the Rules of Professional Conduct?
	A. Yes. Alexander Testimony, Hr'g Tr. 62:13-19, Nov. 2, 2011
6	IN CONCLUSION
7	While the Motion to extend time to file the brief is denied, it is sincerely hoped Ms.
8	Alexander will reflect and begin to prepare for her reinstatement.
9	DATED 18 <sup>th</sup> day of June, 2012,
10	
11	William J. O'Neil
12	Honorable William J. O'Neil Presiding Disciplinary Judge
13	Tresiding Disciplinary Judge
14	ORIGINAL filed with the Disciplinary Clerk
15	this 18 <sup>th</sup> day of June, 2012.
16	
17	COPY of the foregoing mailed/emailed this 19 <sup>th</sup> day of June, 2012 to:
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